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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court in a civil case. This Court
has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(4) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2A-3(2)G).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Appellant Brown asserts that there are six issues on appeal; however, the first two
issues that she lists are not properly before the court. Issues 1 and 2 concern the court's
supposed denial of her motion to continue and motion to compel. Judge Bohling did not rule
on either of these motions, as he treated them as moot in light of his other rulings.1
(Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice, R. 449-450.) Brown does not
argue that Judge Bohling erred in ruling that these motions were moot. Issue Nos. 3, 4, and
5, as described by Brown, all relate to Judge Bohling's denial of Brown's Rule 56(f) motion
to continue in order to allow further discovery. Accordingly, only two issues are presented
to this court for review:
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to

continue the summary judgment hearing pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f); and

1

Although the court's order does not expressly find that plaintiffs motion to compel
was moot, the transcript makes clear that the court felt that it did not need to consider the
motion unless the motion for summary judgment had been denied. (See Transcript of
Hearing, R. 52.) In addition, it is clear that the court did not ignore plaintiffs conflict with
regard to the trial date; the court indicated that if the motion for summary judgment had been
denied, the trial date would have likely been changed in order to accommodate counsel's
schedule. Id. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

Whether the trial court committed error by granting defendant's motion for

summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews the trial court's decision to deny Brown's 56(f) motion for abuse
of discretion. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1987). As
to the trial court's grant of Chick-Fil-A' motion for summary judgment, this court reviews
the trial court's ruling for correctness. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah
1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The trial court's denial of plaintiff s motion to continue and granting of defendant's
motion for summary judgment are governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 56, which provides as
follows:
When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
part}' opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order
as is just.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.
Plaintiff Catherine Brown claims that she was injured due to a fall which occurred as

she was walking through the Fashion Place Mall in Murray, Utah. In the Complaint, Brown
alleges that she slipped and fell on a piece of chicken which was located in the walkway of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the mall. (Second Amended Complaint, R. 42.) Brown filed this case against Chris Glover,
the owner and operator of a Chick-Fil-A restaurant located in the Fashion Place Mall, and
against Hahn Property Management Corporation dba Hahn Company, the property manager
for the Fashion Place Mall.2
On March 31, 1997, Chick-Fil-A filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding the issue of liability for Brown's
accident. (R. 176-219.) In response, Brown filed several motions: a motion to continue the
trial and vacate the scheduling order, a motion to continue the summary judgment hearing
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), and a motion to compel discovery. (R.301-303, 325-327,
330-331.) Brown also filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment. (R. 332-390.)
At the hearing on these motions, the court denied Brown's Rule 56(f) motion based
on the court's finding that the additional discovery would not be material to the issues raised
by Chick-Fil-A's motion, and due to Brown's failure to conduct the discovery in a timely
manner. The court then granted Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment. Brown's
motion to continue the trial and vacate the scheduling order was deemed moot by the grant
of the motion for summary judgment. Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice. (R. 449-451.) The Notice of Appeal was filed on August 6,1997. (R. 455-456.)

2

Defendants will be referred to collectively as "Chick-Fil-A."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented.
1.

Facts relevant to Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment.

As stated in Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment, the relevant facts are as
follows:
1.

On January 18, 1994, Brown was walking past the entrance to The Gap

clothing store in the Fashion Place Mall in Murray, Utah, when she slipped on a substance
which may have been a piece of chicken and fell. (Deposition of Catherine Brown, pp. 116119, R. 190-193; Declaration of Lisa Rose. R. 209-211.)
2.

The entrance to The Gap store where Mrs. Brown fell is approximately 100 feet

away from the entrance to the Chick-Fil-A Restaurant. (Declaration of Lisa Rose, ^j 5,
R.210.)
3.

Defendant Hahn Property Management Corporation is the owner and operator

of the Fashion Place Mall. (Second Amended Complaint, ^J 4, R. 41.)
4.

Defendant Chris Glover was the owner and operator of the Chick-Fil-A fast

food restaurant located in Fashion Place Mall. (Second Amended Complaint, ^f 2, R. 40.)
Glover had been employed by Chick-Fil-A since 1982, and in management or supervisory
positions since 1988. (Glover deposition, pp. 10, 15-16, 18-19, R. 194-198.)
5.

As a part of his marketing efforts, defendant Glover instructed his employees

to give out samples of chicken to Mall patrons as they passed by in front of the Chick-Fil-A
store. (Glover deposition, pp. 23-24, R. 202-203.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

Handing out samples is a standard marketing technique, practiced nationwide

at Chick-Fil-A Restaurants. The procedure for sampling was as follows: a Chick-Fil-A
employee would stand at the entrance to the restaurant with a small table containing pieces
of cut-up chicken. The employee would put toothpicks in the chicken, and offer it to mall
patrons as they walked in front of the restaurant. The employees were instructed that while
handing out the samples, they were to monitor the area and continuously keep it clean and
clear of any debris. (Glover deposition, pp. 20-24, 37-38, R. 194-208. 199-205.)
7.

Employees were also required to place a trash can at the entrance to the

restaurant next to the table set up for sampling, easily available to those who accepted
samples. (Glover Deposition, p. 46, R. 208.)
8.

Defendant Glover never received any complaints from customers regarding the

way that sampling was conducted, and has no recollection of ever seeing any chicken which
had been dropped in the mall common area as a result of sampling. (Glover Deposition, pp.
44-45, R. 206-207.)
9.

The Fashion Place Mall had never at any time received any information,

whether from customer complaints or otherwise, to indicate or imply that the sampling
procedures used by Chick-Fil-A, Defendant Glover, or any other mall tenant were unsafe or
raised any risk of injury to Mall patrons. Other than the incident giving rise to this case,
Fashion Place Mall has never been notified of any accidents related in any way to the
practice of food sampling. (Declaration of Lisa Rose,ffi|6, 7, R. 210-211.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2.

Facts relevant to Brown's Rule 56(f) motion.

Brown's original complaint, along with a set of interrogatories and requests for
production of documents, were served on defendant The Hahn Company on October 19,
1995. Chris Glover dba Chick-Fil-A was substituted as a defendant on January 15, 1996, and
Brown's Second Amended Complaint was filed on February 6, 1996. (R.32-47.) The parties
began discovery of the facts of this case immediately thereafter, and on March 29, 1996,
Chick-Fil-A noticed the deposition of Brown, which was conducted on April 29, 1996.
(R. 55-57, 89-94.) Defendant Glover's deposition was taken on June 25, 1996. (R. 82-83.)
On August 26, 1996, Brown served Chick-Fil-A with a set of interrogatories requesting a list
of employees working on the day of Brown's accident. (R. 97-98.)
On October 30, 1996, the court entered a scheduling order in this case, setting various
deadlines, including a March 14, 1997 discovery cut-off, a dispositive motion deadline of
March 31, 1997, and a trial date of June 3, 1997. (R. 106-107.)
On December 3, 1996, Brown's counsel sent a letter inquiring as to the status of the
outstanding discovery requests. On February 24, 1997, Chick-Fil-A responded to Brown's
request for production of documents, providing, among other things, a list of all persons
employed by the Fashion Place Mall Chick-Fil-A at the time of Brown's accident. (R. 148158.) This exact same information was again provided to Brown in Chick-Fil-A's responses
to Brown's interrogatories, which were served on March 24, 1997. (R. 168-173.) On
March 13, 1997, the parties stipulated to extend the discovery period until April 15, 1997.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. 316.) At that time, Brown did not indicate that any additional time was necessary in
order to complete discovery, or that the discovery responses which Chick-Fil-A had earlier
provided were in any way inadequate.
On March 31, 1997, the final day allowed under the court's scheduling order for
dispositive motions, Chick-Fil-A filed a motion for summary judgment. (R.218-219.) In
response to this motion, Brown filed twenty-seven notices of depositions to be taken during
the last week of May, 1997, well after the close of discovery, and only days before the trial
was scheduled to begin on June 3, 1997. (R. 222-231, 253-298.) These notices were to
schedule depositions of the employees listed in Chick-Fil-A's discovery responses, along
with Mall personnel and a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of defendant Hahn Property Management
Co.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Brown's Rule 56(f)
Motion to Continue.
In considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a Rule 56(f)

motion to continue, the appellate court should consider whether there is a reasonable basis
for the court's ruling. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937,938 (Utah 1993) (trial
court's action reviewed on abuse of discretion standard should be reversed only if found to
be without any reasonable basis).
The trial court denied Brown's request for a Rule 56(f) continuance for two reasons:
first, because the discovery which Brown sought to conduct could have been done well
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

before the summary judgment motion was filed, and second, because the information sought
was not material to the grounds for Chick-Fil-A's motion.
1.

There is a reasonable basis for the trial court's finding that Brown could
have conducted all necessary discovery prior to the summary judgment
motion.

The court's ruling that Brown had an adequate time to complete her discovery is based
upon several simple facts. First, although there was some delay in Chick-Fil-A's responses
to Brown*s discovery requests, all requested discovery was provided well before the close
of discovery and the dispositive motions deadline which had been established by the court.
Second, even after this information had been provided, Brown made no effort to follow up
within the known deadline, and even stipulated to an extension of that deadline without
making any effort to conduct further discovery by scheduling depositions or seeking additional information from Chick-Fil-A.
Brown asserts that the list of employees was vital to her discovery efforts, implying j
that they had been anxious to receive this information, but even after the employee list had
been provided to Brown on February 24, 1997, she made no effort to follow up on that
information and schedule depositions until after Chick-Fil-A's motion had been filed and the
discovery deadline was about to pass. At that point, Brown's only effort was to issue notices \
which attempted to schedule depositions long after the discovery deadline, and only a matter \
of days before the trial was scheduled to begin.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, even though Brown was aware of the impending deadlines, both for the end of
discovery and the upcoming trial, no attempt was made to notice the depositions within the
time allowed. Brown even stipulated to an extension of the discovery period until April 16,
1997, with no hint that this would not be sufficient time in which to conduct all necessary
discovery. It was thus apparent to Judge Bohling that Brown had not seen any need to
depose the Chick-Fil-A employees until after Chick-Fil-A's motion made it apparent that the
evidence would not support Brown's claims.
In all of the cases cited by Brown, the party seeking a Rule 56(f) continuance was still
properly conducting discovers' within the time allowed under any existing scheduling orders.
See Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co,, 947 P.2d 678 (Utah 1997); Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311
(Utah 1984); Auerbach 's Inc. v. Kimball 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 1977). In contrast, this is not
a case in which a motion for summary judgment was granted before discovery was complete.
Rather, Judge Bohling's denial of Brown's request for a continuance was reasonably based
upon the fact that Brown made no attempt to conduct the discovery until after the longestablished deadlines for conducting that discovery had passed.
Brown was obviously aware of the impending deadlines for completing all discovery.
If it is true, as Brown asserts, that she always intended to depose these employees, and was
only prevented from doing so by Chick-Fil-A's failure to provide the list earlier, there is still
no explanation for Brown's complete failure to seek to depose these employees within the
discovery deadline even after they knew the employees' identities. There is thus no
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n

explanation for Brown's failure to abide by the scheduling order set by the court, and Judge
Bohling reasonably found that Brown's untimely attempt to re-open discovery at that point
was an insufficient basis for allowing a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f).
Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment was filed on the last day such motions
would be allowed under the scheduling order, and only two weeks before the end of the
discovery period as it had been extended by stipulation. In essence. Brown is arguing that
Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment is premature, even though it was filed on the
last day allowed for such motions under the court's order. In denying Brown's motion to
continue, Judge Bohling did nothing more than require Brown to abide by the longestablished scheduling order in this case. Far from being unreasonable, such a result should
be expected, if a court's scheduling order is to have any meaning at all.
2.

There is a reasonable basis for the trial court's finding that the additional
discovery sought by Brown would not have been material to the issues
presented by Chick-Fil-A's motion for summary judgment.

One of the recognized grounds for denying a request for a continuance under Rule
56(f) is that the requested discovery would not be likely to provide evidence relevant to the
specific issues raised by the pending motion for summary judgment, or that the reasons stated
for the discovery indicate that the party seeking the continuance is "merely on a 'fishing
expedition' for purely speculative facts after substantial discovery has been conducted without producing any significant evidence." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275,
278 (Utah App. 1987), quoting Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313-14 (Utah 1984).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In her Rule 56(f) affidavit, Brown's counsel asserted that additional discovery was
necessary in order to establish eight listed factual issues:
a.

The skill of the employees serving the chicken;

b.

The policies and procedures actually in place for handing out chicken samples:

c.

The method for handing out chicken samples, specifically: how often the

servers went over the lease line into the mall common area; how often the area was cleaned;
how far into the mall the cleaning extended; how the chicken was prepared; how large the
pieces were cut; how often chicken was dropped on the floor; who was sen/ed chicken:
d.

The substance of the lease agreement between Defendant Hahn and Defendant

Chick-Fil-A;
e.

Whether warnings were issued from Defendant Hahn to Defendant Chick-Fil-A

regarding Defendant Chick-Fil-A's activity within the mall common area;
f.

Defendant Hahn Management's responsibilities for the care and upkeep of the

mall common area, including any cleaning records;
g.

The sum and substance of any discussions between Defendant Hahn and

Defendant Chick-Fil-A regarding Plaintiff and the accident in question; and
h.

The sum and substance of any accident reports for the years 1990 through

present.
Affidavit of Nancy Mishmash. (R. 393-396)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As the trial court found, none of these factual issues had any substantial likelihood of
altering the court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Issues "d" through "h" are
not even relevant to the claims Brown has made in her Complaint. The Second Amended
Complaint asserts only that Chick-Fil-A was negligent due to the fact that the sampling
practice was allegedly an inherently dangerous activity. There is no allegation that ChickFil-A's cleaning practices were inadequate or that Chick-Fil-A was aware of the specific
hazard which caused Brown's fall.

Accordingly, the relationship between the Hahn

Company and Chick-Fil-A, and the cleaning practices of the mall are both irrelevant to the
claims. Likewise, the existence of other slip-and-fall accidents throughout the mall is not
relevant to a determination of whether the sampling done by Chick-Fil-A was 'inherently
dangerous" under the law.3
With regard to the factual issues "a" through "c" listed above, Brown was apparently
seeking to discover additional details about the specific sampling practices of Chick-Fil-A,
and the qualities of the food itself

However, additional details about these sampling

procedures would not have been relevant to the court's consideration of the motion, which
was based on the well-established fact (which is mirrored in the allegations of the
complaint)4 that the employees were handing out pieces of chicken on toothpicks. Defendant

3

Indeed, Chick-Fil-A had already provided Brown with all records of slip-and-fall
accidents which had occurred at the mall, and Brown had not found this information
significant in opposing Chick-Fil-A's motion.
4

The complaint alleges only that chicken samples were being handed out, and does
not assert
that there is anything unusual about the method of distribution itself, instead
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Glover had already testified as to the policies and procedures followed in conducting the
sampling, and this evidence was presented to the court. There is no hint in the record that
there is anything unusual about the practice as conducted at Chick-Fil-A, and Brown herself
did not assert that the employees were doing anything other than simply handing out samples
of chicken on a toothpick.5
Thus, Brown's desire to depose 27 Chick-Fil-A employees is nothing more than a
"fishing expedition," which is insufficient to support a Rule 56(f) continuance.

See

Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, supra, 740 P.2d at 278. The court's ruling was based
§

on the clear law, as explained in section "B" below, which establishes that the practice of
handing out food to store patrons is not an inherently dangerous activity, and that the
particular qualities of the food, i.e., whether the pieces were large or small, or whether the
chicken was greasy, is immaterial to the liability issue. If Brown believed or suspected that
\ some other, more dangerous, activity were taking place with regard to the chicken sampling,
such is not even alleged to have taken place.
Indeed, Brown's "pinnacle" argument, as described in their brief, is that "Defendant's
method of operation, i.e., offering samples of greasy chicken in the mall concourse, created

llcging only a failure to prevent mall patronsfromcarrying the chicken samples away from
' ' store. (See Second Amended Complaint, ffi|15, 18-19, 21-24, R. 40-47.)
The only complaint that Brown could make regarding the specific sampling methods
|I' lck-Fil-A w a s ^ a t the employees would approach mall patrons beyond the store's lease
l c t0
°ffer the samples. (R. 334) This fact was assumed for purposes of the court's ruling
"itne motion for summary judgment and Brown's counsel argued this point extensively at
Digitized byhearing.
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a dangerous condition such that Plaintiff need not prove actual or constructive notice of the
condition

In order to advance this theory, Plaintiff needed to talk with the Chick-Fil-A

employees that actually distributed the chicken to the mall patrons." Brief of Appellant,
pp. 20-21. To the contrary. Brown did not need to depose any Chick-Fil-A employees to
establish this theory; the feet that these employees were handing out food in the mall was
assumed for purposes of the summary judgment motion, and Brown made extensive argument based upon this theory to the trial court.
The theory Brown proposed is exactly the fact situation that the trial court assumed
when it made its ruling; the court accepted Brown's version of the facts for purposes of
making the argument on summary judgment, and found that such facts did not support a
finding of liability under the applicable law. (See Transcript of Hearing, pp. 48-51.)
Whether Brown might actually have been able to prove such a theory by additional discovery
was thus deemed by the court to be irrelevant. The law which forms the basis for the court's
ruling in this case does not depend upon a factual issue of whether the food is handed out
inside or outside the lease line of the store, and how many other people are nearby. Rather,
the court simply applied the clearly established law to hold that these details are not relevant
to the liability issue.
B.

The Trial Court Was Correct in Finding That Chick-Fil-A's Food Sampling Is
Not an Inherently Dangerous Activity.
It should be noted that although Brown states that the substance of the trial court's

ruling on the
summary judgment motion is an issue before this court (see Brief of Appellant,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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p.-), Brown's brief fails to make any argument whatsoever on this issue. Brown has not set
forth the facts in the record which they claim support their theory of liability, and Brown has
made no argument that the facts as presented to the trial court could support a finding of
liability. The only argument submitted to this court in Brown's brief challenges the trial
court's denial of Brown's motion to continue. Thus, Brown apparently concedes that, if only
the facts in the record before the court are considered, the trial court correctly found that
there was no factual issue preventing summary judgment, and that this case was properly
dismissed. "It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument
that a party has failed to adequately Brief" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68,
1997 Utah Lexis 105 (Utah 1997), citing State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 263 (Ct. App. 1995),
cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989).
Nevertheless, even if the court is inclined to review the substance of the trial court's
decision, the law relating to the practice of food sampling is clear. And the facts clearly
show that simply handing out chicken samples does not give rise to any liability for Brown's
injuries as a matter of law. The general principle is well-established:
This court has held that "[t]he owner of a business is not a guarantor that his
business invitees will not slip and fall. He is charged with the duty to use
reasonable care to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe
condition for his patrons."
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476,478 (Utah 1996), quoting Preston v. Lamb,
436 P.2d 1021,1022 (Utah 1968). There are two basic approaches to storeowner liability for
a slip and fall. In the primary class of cases, involving an unsafe condition of a temporary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nature (such as the spilled food alleged in this case), a storeowner is not liable for a patron's
fall unless the owner had either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.
Here, there was no allegation that Chick-Fil-A knew or should have known of the existence
of the piece of chicken which allegedly caused Brown's fall.
Brown attempted to characterize the facts of this case as falling into a secondary class
of cases, in which courts have found a business liable when it engages in a "dangerous
activity." See Schnuphase, 916 P.2d at 479-80. In Schnuphase, the Utah Supreme Court
held that a storeowner's distribution of ice cream to deli customers was not a basis for
liability when one customer slipped and fell because of food that had been dropped on the
ground by another customer. Because food distribution was not, as a matter of law,
inherently dangerous, the court refused to require a higher duty of care or additional safety
precautions. Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479.
As was the case in Schnuphase, Brown's claim in this case is based on a theory that
Chick-Fil-A's food distribution imposed some higher duty of care because it was somehow
"inherently dangerous." The complaint suggests that Chick-Fil-A was negligent in failing
to "request the Mall patrons to enter the restaurant to sample the chicken .. ." (Complaint,
Tf 18); or to "ensure that those Mall patrons that accepted samples of chicken from the
defendant Chick-Fil-A remain in the restaurant and not continue walking until they had
finished eating the samples of chicken." (Complaint, ^J 23.)6 What Brown apparently seeks
6
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is a requirement that whenever food is distributed, the storeowner must supervise its
consumption by patrons in order to make certain that food is not carried away and possibly
disposed of improperly. These suggestions are actually more intrusive and more impractical
than those suggested by the plaintiff in Schnuphase and explicitly rejected by the Court:
Specifically, Schnuphase claims that Storehouse Markets failed to take the
following precautionary measures: installation of nonskid mats or any other
traction-enhancing coverings, placement of warning signs indicating the possibility of encountering spilled ice cream, appointment of a spill monitor in the
deli section, or installation of a lower counter to facilitate employee monitoring in the area.
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479.
Brown also seeks to extend the duty considerably beyond that sought by the plaintiff
in Schnuphase by alleging that Chick-Fil-A was negligent not only because of the lack of
special safety measures with regard to the immediate area, but also due to their failure to
extend such special measures to guarantee safety elsewhere in the Mall. However, the
problem with this argument is that there are no facts alleged that are sufficient to show that
any special measures were reasonably required as a result of the sampling. The court in
Schnuphase ruled as a matter of law that no special safety measures were required at all in
distributing food (regardless of how simple they might be), even in the immediate area.7

that the immediate area was kept clean and that these measures are entirely impractical, the
facts of this case indicate that such measures would not have prevented Brown's accident,
which took place at some distance away from the sampling. Failure to take precautions
which would not have prevented Brown's injury cannot form a basis for a suit by her.
7
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There is thus no issue of fact in this case regarding the adequacy of any special safety
measures that Chick-Fil-A did take, because no special measures were required.
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360
(Utah 1973), Chick-Fil-A in this case need only have acted reasonably in distributing the
samples:
In applying that standard to the question as to whether the defendant should
have been expected to take further precautions to avoid injury to its customers,
it is only fair and proper to make that determination from the standpoint of
foresight and not hindsight. If its duty required further safety measures, we are
made to wonder what they would be, and how far the defendant would have
to go in protecting the customers, both in method and in area. There does not
appear to be any reasonable and practical answer to that inquiry.
531 P.2d at 362. The absurd logical extensions feared by the Court in Long with regard to
the "area" in which a storeowner must take special precautions are directly presented by
Brown's theory in this case. There simply are no reasonable efforts by defendant which
could address the circumstances which led to Brown's injury, because any attempt to address
them would seemingly require Chick-Fil-A to follow each patron around the mall until they
have either swallowed their chicken sample or thrown it away. Brown suggests that ChickFil-A failed to require patrons to consume the samples in the immediate vicinity of the
sampling. However, such a requirement would effectively prevent any distribution of food

prevented Brown's injuries in this case. What is at issue here is not the foreseeability of
patrons simply dropping chicken samples; rather, it is the foreseeability of patrons carrying
a sample through the mall for 100 feet and then dropping it.
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samples, and as Long and Schnuphase directly hold, it is not negligent to give out food
merely because there is a possibility that patrons will drop it.
In Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals
considered a storeowner's liability for a slip and fall inside the store which was alleged to
have been caused by lettuce leaves dropped on the floor by store patrons as they served
themselves from display boxes of lettuce. The court reversed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment due to the fact that there was evidence upon which a fact finder could
believe that the storeowner should have foreseen a danger to his customers and taken
additional reasonable steps to compensate for it. The ruling in Canfield is based the
existence of direct evidence that the store was aware of an unusual hazard which actually
caused the plaintiffs injury. In Canfield, the store actually intended customers to handle the
lettuce and discard leaves, and the issue was whether the store had adequately provided for
the disposal of the leaves that customers were expectedTo drop. "Albertsons chose a method
of displaying and offering lettuce for sale where it was expected that third parties would
remove and discard the outer leaves from heads of lettuce they intended to purchase."
Canfield, 841 P.2d at 1227. As noted by the Court in Schnuphase, the liability found in
Canfield was based entirely on the court's finding that these facts provided sufficient
evidence of actual notice of the leaves on the floor. In distinguishing Canfield, the Supreme
Court held that it was the existence of such actual notice which formed the basis for liability,
and that the mere distribution of food to customers did not provide any such evidence of
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actual notice of a hazardous condition. It is the combination of the store's intent and design
in Canfield that the customers would have to dispose of the leaves, coupled with a factual
dispute as to the adequacy of the means provided for disposing of them, that precluded
summary7 judgment. In this case, there is obviously no intent or design by Chick-Fil-A that
those accepting samples would discard the chicken. Thus, there can be no inference of
knowledge.8
Accordingly, the rule set out in Schnuphase clearly governs here. As in that case,
Brown here ''makes the bare assertion that [defendants'] method of operation created a
situation where it was reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties would
create a dangerous condition or defect." However, as was the case in Schnuphase, "Canfield
does not support liability in this case because [plaintiff] failed to provide evidence of the
foreseeability of an inherently dangerous condition." 918 P.2d at 479.
In addition, the common practice of sampling has been expressly approved by Utah
courts, and has been held not to require any special safety precautions. The Utah Supreme
Court stated in Long that giving away food samples:
is a well known and widely practiced method of merchandising and we see no
reason why the same rules should not apply as to the other operations of the
market. Neither do we believe that the giving away of samples of pie should
be regarded as inherently dangerous.
8

Brown cites to the fact that there was a trash can nearby as evidence of knowledge,
but the only thing that Chick-Fil-A intended for customers to dispose of was the toothpick.
Although Chick-Fil-A could thus be charged with the knowledge that customers would
discard toothpicks, toothpicks do not present any danger, and, indeed, Brown does not allege
that she slipped on a toothpick.
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531 P.2d at 362. Likewise, in Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah
1975), defendants had been distributing samples of cottage cheese on small crackers. The
plaintiff slipped on cottage cheese which was dropped by a customer who had accepted a
sample. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the
practice of sampling did not constitute a dangerous condition, even though the plaintiff
argued that defendants had used a negligent method in conducting the sampling. Id., 538
P.2datl77.
Other cases involving the practice of distributing food samples are to the same effect.
In Morgan v. American Meat Co., Inc., 46 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio 1942), the defendant had been
distributing samples of olives to customers, and the plaintiff was injured when she slipped
on an olive which had been dropped in the store. In granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the court held that:
the giving away of articles of food in grocery stores, as samples, has long been
a recognized method of advertising and there is no rule of law which will
charge the merchant with knowledge that the customers will dispose of what
remains of the sample in such a way as to make the store dangerous to other
customers.
46 N.E. 2d at 672. See also Stanley Stores, Inc. v. Veazy, 838 S.W.2d 884 (Texas 1992)
(distribution of soft drink samples was not a "negligent activity" which could form the basis
for liability when patron slipped on a spilled drink).
Brown has not presented or even alleged any facts which would indicate that the
sampling done by Chick-Fil-A was unusual or differed from the practices at issue in
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Schnuphase, Long, and Allen. For example, Brown argued that the mall was busy on the da>
of her accident, and that Chick-Fil-A intentionally conducted their sampling during bus)
times. That is exactly the circumstance alleged in Long, in which the plaintiff pointed ou
that the samples of pumpkin pie were deliberately handed out on the day before
Thanksgiving, and "it was to be expected that the store would be filled with shoppers.** 531
P.2dat361.
Brown also alleges that Chick-Fil-A's actions posed a foreseeable risk due to th<
inherently dangerous qualities of chicken on a toothpick. However, all three of the plaintiff
in Schnuphase, Long, and Allen made similar arguments, i.e., that the particularly slipper
and unstable qualities of, respectively, ice cream in a cone, pie on a plate, or cottage chees
on a cracker made distribution an unusually dangerous activity. However, in none of thos
cases did the Court feel the need undertake any analysis regarding the particular qualities o
the food given out, and no such analysis is required here.9 Certainly there can be no seriou
argument that there is a legally significant difference between the inherent dangerousness c
chicken on a toothpick as opposed to ice cream in a cone, pie on a plate, or cottage chees
on a cracker.

9

For example, the plaintiff in Long pointed out that "due to the unique character c
pumpkin pie with whipped cream, it would be slippery and dangerous if dropped on th
floor." Long, 531 P.2d at 361. Likewise, in Allen, the plaintiff argued that the defendar
used an unreasonable method because the cottage cheese samples were placed on a sma
cracker, which plaintiff asserted made it likely that some would be spilled. Similarly, th
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Indeed, the only fact which distinguishes this case from Schnuphase, Long, and Allen
is that in those cases the food was spilled inside the defendants' stores in the immediate area
of the distribution. If it is not reasonable to impute knowledge of spilled food located within
the store itself, it is even less reasonable to impute to the business owner knowledge of food
which has been carried away and dropped some 100 feet away from the business.
Any finding of liability under the facts presented by this case would essentially be a
finding that selling or giving away food is per se an inherently dangerous practice, and would
completely undercut the general principle that storeowners are not guarantors of patrons'
safety. As the court in Schnuphase recognized, the distribution of food for consumption
either on or off the premises of the store is a common practice, and one which requires only
that ordinary care be exercised to inspect regularly and clean up known spills. Brown has
made no allegation that Chick-Fil-A failed to fulfill this duty.
Indeed, this analysis only serves to emphasize the correctness of Judge Bohling's
ruling with regard to Brown's Rule 56(f) motion. The specific details Brown sought to
further investigate regarding the sampling procedures and the "skill" level of the employees
handing out the samples is simply irrelevant in the face of the well-established law holding
that handing food to store patrons is not an inherently dangerous activity.10

10

In addition to the grounds stated in Judge Bohling's order granting summary judgment, defendant The Hahn Company also sought summary judgment based on the lack of
any evidence which would provide a basis for holding it liable for the actions of Chick-Fil-A.
Brown did not respond to this argument at all, and it was not resolved by Judge Bohling, in
light of his other rulings. However, this argument provides an alternative basis for affirming
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CONCLUSION
Judge Bohling's decision to deny Brown's Rule 56(f) motion to continue was based
upon Brown's failure to complete her discovery within the long-established deadlines, and
due to the fact that the proposed discover}' was not relevant to the issues presented by the
motion. Such is sufficient to constitute a reasonable basis for the denial, and that decision
should be upheld. In addition, Utah law clearly provides that distribution of food to
customers is not an inherently dangerous condition, and Judge Bohling's order granting
summary judgment should be affirmed.
DATED this ! C day of August, 1998.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By: / Q ^ V A l y V ^
John'R. Lund
Scott K. Wilson
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